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DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE! 
 
Note to reader: 
This paper constitutes a part of my larger PhD project, in which I am investigating factors that 
motivate negotiators’ choice of justice principles in international negotiations with the aim of 
strengthening the theoretical link between justice and effectiveness of negotiations. All 
headlines are working titles and will be revised at a later stage. The empirical analysis has not 
yet been concluded, hence the draft does not include findings yet. Directional hypotheses 
outlined in the theory section point out expectations though. There is reference to a conceptual 
paper, also part of my larger PhD project, which discusses a more comprehensive approach 
towards ‘justice’ in environmental negotiations. The manuscript is in preparation and can be 
made available upon request. 
I am looking forward to feedback on any aspect of the draft at this early stage. 
 
 
Justice Behaviour in International Environmental 
Negotiations 
 




Questions of justice are often at the heart of international negotiations. While previous research has 
established a link between justice and the effectiveness of negotiations, the mechanisms behind 
justice behaviour in international negotiations remain understudied. Against this background, this 
paper will investigate the question: What factors determine which justice principle negotiators 
invoke or agree to in international environmental negotiations? In order to answer this question this 
study will apply a controlled comparison applying the congruence method to five pairs of cases, 
covering a broad range of environmental negotiations. Within each pair, one factor theorized to play 
an important role in shaping justice behaviour in environmental negotiations will be analysed. The 
factors are 1) setting of the negotiations, 2) power balance between the parties, 3) scientific 
(un)certainty, 4) domestic constituencies, and 5) common crisis experience. 
The findings are expected to discern factors determining which justice principles negotiators invoke 
and under what conditions agreement on justice notions is promoted. Better understanding of what 
motivates negotiators’ choices of justice principles and their mutual acceptance can help to 
strengthen the link between justice and effectiveness of negotiations. In this way, the paper’s 






On December 12, 2015, 196 parties adopted the Paris Agreement under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a result of two weeks of intense 
negotiations at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21). The agreement was seen as a 
milestone in the global effort to address adverse effects of anthropogenic climate change. This 
perceived success was among other aspects, based on creative justice mechanisms, such as 
building parties’ commitments on self-set and non-binding Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs). This approach was taken in contrast to previous, more prescriptive 
measures, such as the provisions under the Kyoto protocol that was signed in late 1997 but did 
not enter into force until 2005, largely due to lacking ratification by the US. The provisions in 
the Kyoto protocol were meant to spread costs for addressing climate change in a just manner 
between Annex I (largely developed countries) and non-Annex I (largely developing countries) 
parties, but were ultimately often perceived as unjust by countries on both sides. This dynamic 
points toward the important role of justice in environmental negotiations and its ability to both 
positively and negatively influence the negotiation process or outcome. 
Justice plays an important role in the complex dynamics of international environmental 
negotiations. In some cases, justice principles can be conducive to a more effective negotiation 
process (Albin and Druckmann 2014 a, 2014b, and forthcoming), or increase the acceptability, 
legitimacy, and durability of the negotiated agreement (Druckman and Albin 2011, Kapstein 
2008, Zartman 1995). For example, the negotiations of the Stockholm Convention on banning 
Persistent Organic Pollutants were marked by progressive distributive justice mechanisms and 
a proactive approach towards procedural justice principles that led to a comparatively fast 
conclusion of a robust and widely-accepted agreement. In other cases however, justice can 
become an obstacle to the successful conclusion of environmental negotiations. Parties can get 
so entrenched in discussions around those principles that they are unable to make progress on 
the substantive issues. Likewise, parties might be dissatisfied with distributive or procedural 
justice aspects of a particular negotiation and therefore unwilling to continue the process or 
accept the outcome. A case in point are the UNFCCC negotiations during the COP15 in 
Copenhagen, where perceived violations of justice principles led to a weak outcome in form of 
a two page statement that the plenum merely took note of. 
While the potential for positive influence of justice principles on international negotiations is 
being increasingly recognized in the scholarly debate (Albin and Druckman 2014a, 2014b, 
Young and Wolf 1992, Zartman 1995), it remains unclear under what circumstances these 
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positive effects come to bear or when reverse effects might occur. In order to address this 
lacuna, it is important to take a step back in the causal chain and investigate factors that 
determine justice behaviour in international negotiations. Focussing on the field of 
environmental negotiations, this paper thus attempts to address the research question: What 
factors determine which justice principle negotiators invoke or agree to in international 
environmental negotiations? 
Investigating factors that determine justice behaviour in international negotiations is important 
to understand what underlying assumptions and expectations negotiators bring to the table and 
how the dynamics of the negotiations process unfold. If more is known about the preceding 
factors, the theoretical link established between justice and effectiveness of international 
negotiations can be strengthened. Also, if factors can be discerned that promote or hamper the 
positive influence that justice can have on effectiveness, policy recommendations can be 
formulated regarding under what circumstances or in what form justice can be conducive and 
vice versa. 
The study at hand aims to investigate such factors shaping justice behaviour in international 
environmental negotiations, thereby focussing on justice understood as perceptions expressed 
through statements by negotiators as representatives of state parties. A number of hypotheses 
will be tested on pairs of environmental negotiation cases through a controlled comparison 
applying the congruence method (George and Bennett2005: 181ff.) in order to explain variation 
in justice adherence. 
In the following, the notion of justice in environmental negotiations will be discussed shortly 
and justice principles in the focus of analysis will be identified. Subsequently, five factors that 
are theorized to shape justice behaviour in environmental negotiations will be discussed, 
namely the 1) setting (size) of the negotiations, 2) power balance between the parties, 3) 
scientific (un)certainty, 4) domestic constituencies, and 5) common crisis experience. The 
analysis of empirical cases will follow where for each factor respectively two environmental 
negotiation cases are contrasted. Thereby case selection is based on a "most similar” design 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970) to find cases that differ in outcome but are comparable on all but 
one of the theorised factors (as well as a number of other relevant characteristics). [Findings] 





Justice in International Environmental Negotiations 
Justice plays a role in almost all issue areas of international negotiations. In peace negotiations, 
parties seek justice for harm suffered during the conflict and for example satisfied justice claims 
have been found to impact the durability of peace agreements (Druckman and Albin 2011). In 
arms control cases, justice often relates to equal reductions or ceilings and can impact the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the outcome (Albin and Druckman 2014a, Müller 2010, 
Tannenwald 2013). Similarly, in the field of economics, where the concept of the rational 
“economic man” is arguably most commonly and rigorously applied and the application of 
justice principles perhaps least expected, it has been found to influence negotiation 
effectiveness (Albin and Druckman 2014b, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The decision for this study 
to focus on the role of justice in environmental negotiations is based on a number of factors. 
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, environmental negotiations are one of the most prevalent 
forms of international negotiations in today’s globalized world. This is underlined by a growing 
body of research on justice in environmental negotiations such as studies dealing with 
normative concerns in regulating carbon trading (Page 2012), fair distribution of access to water 
resources (Zeitoun 2013), or equitable burden sharing of costs of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation (e.g. Young and Wolf 1992, Ringius et al 2002), to name but a few. The items on 
the agenda are of a transboundary, or even global, character and hence addressing them requires 
a coordinated international response (Kaul and Mendoza 2003: 97ff.). At the same time, 
cooperative agreements between two or more states often remain the best, or even only, 
alternative in addressing threats emerging from environmental change. Both negative effects of 
states’ conduct, i.e. environmental degradation, and positive effects of mitigation efforts do not 
halt at state borders and are non-excludable1. At the same time, usually a considerable number 
of states is needed to change their polluting conduct or partake in mitigation efforts in order to 
achieve substantial improvement. Thus, unilateral action is rarely a feasible alternative to 
international negotiations. 
A second reason to focus on the environmental issue area is that justice mechanisms are very 
central to environmental negotiations and in many cases explicitly addressed. It is commonly 
recognized that developed countries were the main contributors to and profiteers of decades of 
environmental exploitation. Therefore they bear a particular responsibility regarding mitigation 
                                                          
1 Items that are considered non-excludable cannot be withheld from parties not participating in a joint 
undertaking to leading to the cooperative benefit, hence creating problems of ”free-riding”, that is profiting from 
other parties’ efforts whithout an own contribution. Many environmental issues are in line with this characteristic 
duie to their transboundary nature. 
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of and adaption to environmental threats. Many justice debates in environmental negotiations 
build on this responsibility aspect on multiple levels, including the international, intranational, 
and intergenerational level (Rao 2013, Weiss 1993, 2008). While the responsibility of 
developed states to take action and to support other countries is generally acknowledged, the 
details of it remain heatedly debated. When does responsibility set in, considering that in the 
early years of industrialization parties were arguably unaware of the negative consequences of 
their conduct for the environment? What should be the extent to which developed countries 
transfer technical and financial support to less developed countries – to support them in ensuring 
provision of basic human needs or further, to aim to equalise economic capabilities? What is 
the responsibility of emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, and India that do not count 
toward the developed countries, but are for example among the major emitters of carbon 
dioxide? These are just a few of the questions that drive debates in environmental negotiations, 
where justice principles are explicitly and centrally addressed. 
A third reason to focus on the environmental issue area is a more pragmatic one concerning 
data availability. Environmental negotiations moved into the focus of international negotiations 
comparatively recently, following the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment held in Stockholm. Thus, the cases in this issue area tend to be fairly well 
documented. Additionally, because environmental negotiations tend not to count towards 
“hard” security issues, documentation is more readily available, including for most recent or 
contemporary cases. With the three reasons as outlined above in mind, the issue area of 
environmental negotiations lends itself in particular to the analysis of justice behaviour in 
international negotiations with the aim of discerning patterns and trends across cases that should 
lead to generalizable results. 
 
Justice as a central theme to environmental negotiations has been the subject of an increasing 
number of scientific studies over the past decades. Despite this growing body of research on 
the concept, there is no single definition of ‘justice’ in environmental negotiations. Given the 
complexity of the phenomenon and the contested nature of the terminology, this does not come 
as a surprise. At the same time, however, the literature is also marked by a lack of a 
comprehensive approach towards justice in environmental negotiations. Definitions are often 
borrowed from other fields of research or jargon used by practitioners in negotiations and is 
hence often too broad, covers the concept only partially, or is too functionally oriented. Thus, 
as developed elsewhere (Tritschoks, manuscript in preparation), a more comprehensive 
approach towards justice in environmental negotiations is suggested that should cover all 
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important components of justice that are characteristic for this issue area, considering unique 
feature of environmental negotiations. The components that have been found to be crucial for 
a comprehensive approach towards justice in environmental negotiations encompass the 
reference to both procedural and distributive justice, the recognition of the independent merit 
of justice going beyond pure national economic interest, the inclusion of parties that are unable 
to reciprocate in a strict sense of the term, and the consideration of both retrospective and 
prospective aspects. Firstly, in many studies the focus of investigating the role of justice has 
been placed on distributive issues that is “principles for allocating benefits or burdens among 
the members of a group or community” (Druckman and Wagner 2016: 389). More recently, 
stronger emphasis has been placed on the role of procedural justice issues or “principles for 
guiding the negotiation process toward agreement” (ibid: 391). For a comprehensive approach, 
it is expected that both components should equally be regarded, particularly because it is argued 
that they interact and affect each other rather than assuming only one component to moderate 
the other2. Secondly, some studies argue that justice positions of negotiators are largely 
“correlated with the self-interest of the negotiating parties” (Lange et al. 2010: 370) and hence 
doubt the independent merit of justice in environmental negotiations. While there will surely 
be overlap between negotiators’ justice positions and parties’ self-interest, this study argues that 
a pure tactical use of justice principles is not very common because justice claims have to be 
credible enough not to be outright dismissed (Albin 2015: 52) and “schemes that are too 
obviously self-serving have little power to persuade others” (Young and Wolf 1992: 51). 
Therefore, it is assumed that justice in environmental negotiations has merit on its own and 
goes beyond pure self-interest of the negotiators. Thirdly, many traditional definitions of justice 
are based on assumptions of reciprocity and that negotiated agreements are ultimately based on 
expected return in the bargaining game (Rawls 1971, Gauthier 1986, Barry 1989). However, in 
the environmental issue are, parties are included and their concerns taken into account, that 
cannot strictly reciprocate. For example, the inclusion of least developed countries or small 
island states, as well as future generations’ concerns could not be explained through theories 
based on strict reciprocity. Instead, they have to consider alternative explanations and more 
fluid understandings of reciprocity, related to deeper rooted values and beliefs. Thus, a 
comprehensive approach towards justice in environmental negotiations should consider the 
inclusion of ‘non-reciprocators’ as part of the justice concept. Lastly, previous definitions of 
justice in negotiations often focus on the backward orientation (Welch 1993, 2014, Zartman 
                                                          
2 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Tritschoks, manuscript in preparation. 
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1995, Grasso 2010) of equalizing desert. A few studies emphasise a need for forward orientation 
instead (Zartman 2005). It is argued here, however, that neither reference point works without 
satisfying the other and that both aspects should be equally considered under a comprehensive 
approach toward justice in environmental negotiations.  
Thus, justice in this study is understood as negotiators’ stated willing ness to find a convergence 
point of all affected parties’ interests through proposals perceived to address past, current, or 
future desert on both the distributive and procedural level. Negotiators’ statements in line with 
this approach will be considered as part of the justice behaviour in the environmental 
negotiation cases analysed in this study. Thereby, justice principles will be measured as either 
pertaining to distributive justice or procedural justice, each operationalized in four different 
principles respectively. Distributive justice encompasses three principles most commonly 
referred to in the literature. Equality refers to an equal or fair division of shares, proportionality 
(sometimes referred to as equity) foresees a division of shares in accordance to individual 
contributions, and need considers fair shares based on individual needs or desert (Deutsch 1975, 
Eckhoff, 1974, Cook and Hegtvedt 1983). A fourth principle, not always included but yet 
important, is that of compensation, in terms of indemnification for incurred loss or damage. 
(Cook and Hegtvedt 1983, Albin and Druckmann forthcoming, Zartman 1992). 
The procedural justice principles include fair representation that refers to the inclusion of all 
relevant parties with a stake in the negotiation (Thibaut and Walker 1975), either through full 
representation - usually for smaller scale negotiations, or in form of balanced representation - 
often applied as the number of parties increases. Fair treatment and play regards the 
“opportunity to present information relevant to the decision” (Lind and Earley 1992: 231). 
Transparency of the process is marked by openness and accessibility of information. Voluntary 
agreement as a procedural justice principle reflects on the fact that the allocation outcome 
should be accepted by all parties on their own will and without coercion or duress. (Barry 1995). 
This study argues that certain structural and perceptive factors determine which of these aspects 
negotiators will invoke in international environmental negotiations or how much agreement 







Factors Influencing Justice Behaviour 
Based on the analysis of previous literature and in-depth case studies of environmental 
negotiations cases, five factors that determine justice behaviour in international negotiations 
have been discerned. These factors are the 1) setting of the negotiations, 2) power balance 
between the parties, 3) scientific (un)certainty, 4) domestic constituencies, and 5) common 
crisis experience, and will be discussed in turn below. The list is by no means exhaustive, but 
includes those factors that are seen as fundamental and pertaining to most environmental 
negotiation cases thus allowing for an analysis across a broad range of cases and the uncovering 
of relevant patterns. They include the most important structural factors in terms of the number 
of parties involved and the power relationships. Additionally, the list covers crucial perceptive 
factors that can shape the negotiators’ perception of an issue and that have often been found to 
be influential in previous literature. 
 
Setting of the Negotiation 
This first factor focuses on whether the negotiations are of a bilateral or multilateral character. 
It is based on the theoretical argument that issues of complexity of the negotiation process will 
differ between the two settings. On the multilateral scale that involves an ever increasing 
number of parties and issues, procedural justice is put in focus very differently than in bilateral 
settings. Firstly, negotiation agenda and processes have to be simplified with the help of justice 
issues to make agreement possible in light of the many different parties and issues involved 
(Albin and Young, 2012). Secondly, multilateral negotiations are often marked by continuity, 
long term perspective, and expected repeat negotiation rounds, increasing the importance of 
procedural issues, whereas bilateral negotiations tend to be more definite and closed in time 
and hence can have a stronger focus on distributive issues. (Albin and Druckman, 2014b). Thus, 
the expectation for the first factor size is that procedural justice principles should be more 
pronounced in multilateral settings where complexity considerably reduces the role of 
distributive justice principles, while for bilateral settings distributive justice principles can play 
a more prominent role. 
H1: In multilateral settings, negotiators will invoke PJ principles more often than DJ 






Power Balance between the Negotiating Parties 
A strictly rational choice argumentation in international negotiations theory would expect 
power inequalities to diminish the role of justice in negotiations simply because the more 
powerful party will likely be able to impose their position onto the other (see for example 
Gauthier 1986, Barry 1989). However, justice plays an important role also between perceived 
unequal states. While there are some studies arguing that states will only invoke justice 
principles that are in line with their national self-interest (Lange et al 2010), it is argued here 
that states can go beyond their pure economic self-interest and that justice plays an independent 
role in international negotiations. In the environmental issue area, power imbalance is not 
limited to traditional understandings of resource power but can also relate to “pollution 
exporters” and “pollution importers” (Sjöstedt 1993: 32), or states with very different 
capabilities to adapt. Given this multiplicity of power aspects, negotiations among states with 
considerable power imbalance are not uncommon in environmental negotiations. While notions 
of justice principles often overlap with national economic interest, there is still an independent 
merit to justice in negotiations and “moral and justice concerns are genuine and based on strong 
convictions, deeply enshrined in the belief system of greater or smaller powers and […] their 
conflation with what we usually call national interest is what political leaders and bureaucrats 
believe is the right thing to do.” (Müller 2013: 362). In this context, justice plays an important 
role when weak parties bargain with the strong. For one, parties that recognize their 
comparatively weak power position in the negotiations might draw on justice principles to 
strengthen their bargaining position vis-á-vis the stronger parties. Additionally, weak parties in 
environmental negotiations, particularly developing and least developed countries, are often in 
a disadvantaged position because they do not have comparable capacities to partake in the 
complex and demanding negotiations. Their delegations are often considerably smaller than 
those of stronger economies and they often have to rely on external sources for technical 
expertise. Their diplomats “may only have a generalist’s understanding of the scientific and 
technical nature of the environmental problem under discussion” (Chasek 1997: 442). Thus, it 
can be expected that weaker parties will more often invoke procedural justice principles, not 
only to strengthen their position and standing, but also because they lack the capacity to engage 
and compete with stronger states on the often very technical issues regarding distributive 
justice. 
H2: In negotiations marked by noticeable power inequality, the weaker party/parties will more 





Scientific uncertainty is a central component of most environmental negotiations. This 
uncertainty is not necessarily strategic, as given in most negotiation settings where parties have 
incentives to withhold information from each other. It rather rests on the unavailability of 
undisputed information. In the first instance, scientific uncertainty can play a role in parties’ 
perceptions of whether a problem exists at all (Faure and Rubin 1993: 22). Once this hurdle has 
been taken, scientific uncertainty will usually surround a whole range of other aspects that are 
central to the negotiations, such as the underlying causes of the environmental degradation, the 
long term consequences of current practice, the most appropriate solution to an emerging 
problem, or the exact costs for mitigation and adaptation (Spector 1992, Faure and Rubin 1993, 
Sjöstedt 2009: 253). This leaves parties to the negotiation faced with the highly challenging 
task of choosing between either acting based on estimates and in the face of uncertainty, or 
postponing action waiting for greater scientific clarity but thereby risking to cause irreversible 
damage to the ecosystem. (Benedick 1993: 219, Chasek 2001: 29). Against the background of 
uncertainty regarding exact causes, consequences, and costs of behaviour that is harmful to the 
environment, a multitude of justice claims can reasonably be brought forward by the different 
negotiating parties. “One side’s suggested solution may often be deemed just as feasible (or 
otherwise) as suggestions advanced by the other” (Faure and Rubin 1993: 22). In this context, 
science can play both a disabling and enabling role. Where multiple positions are supported by 
different scientific findings, coming to a political agreement will be incredibly difficult. Each 
side can claim their position to be just, as supported by the scientific evidence that suits them 
best. Suesskind and Ali speak of “adversary science” that can hinder progress in environmental 
negotiations by lending the same legitimacy to all claims brought to the table (2015). Reversely, 
where there is “consensual knowledge”, that is findings that are accepted by broad consensus 
among scientific scholars (Skodvin and Underdal 2000: 24), scientific uncertainty will decrease 
and enable political agreement. Thereby it is not expected that uncertainty will be eliminated. 
Rather, what matters is that parties agree on a baseline model that can guide the negotiations 
and make political agreement possible (Underdal 2000: 183). This is not to say that science 
should be understood as a neutral, objective input that can help parties in determining the truly 
“just” approach to addressing an environmental problem. Scientific knowledge will always 
remain subject to interpretation and vulnerable to attempts of political manipulation. However, 
it has been found that “consensual knowledge” is rarely disputed by state parties and that parties 
are more willing to change their bargaining position with increasing availability of knowledge 
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(ibid.). Also, like-minded “epistemic communities” of scientists and experts have been found 
to be important in transforming the issue under negotiation to promote consensus and encourage 
compliance with an agreement (Haas 1989). Against this background, increased scientific 
knowledge is expected to narrow the range of available options for reasonable justice claims to 
be made and thereby facilitate consensus regarding which justice principle to invoke. This 
should pertain particularly to distributive justice, as scientific knowledge usually addresses the 
technical components of an environmental issues. 
H3: When there is agreement on a scientific model as the basis for negotiations, negotiators 
will invoke and agree on distributive justice principles accordingly. 
 
Domestic Constituencies 
When analysing international negotiations between state parties, the latter are often simplified 
into being seen as a single entity for analytical purposes. However, it has been recognized that 
“while the actors between whom international negotiations take place are often individuals, at 
least as often they are groups or organizations, with complex internal workings of their own” 
(Rubin 2002: 99). For those internal dynamics, domestic constituencies are of particularly 
importance. The logic of the two-level game developed by Putnam (1988) alludes to the fact 
that negotiating parties often need the support of their domestic constituency, be it democratic 
audiences, strong lobbies, or bureaucracies, in order to implement a negotiated agreement. This 
means that with growing interest and engagement of the domestic constituency, parties will be 
more limited in their bargaining range, because they have to feed back to the national level after 
agreement is struck on the international level. This can determine justice behaviour both in 
terms of genuine constraints or as a tactical tool. Still, justice can play both a constraining or 
promoting role. Kjellén discusses the constraining role in that there is often the dual challenge 
of coming to a substantive environmental agreement that satisfies not only the negotiating 
parties but also the domestic constituency, in order to increase the chances for ratification 
(2008). However, domestic audiences, particularly in democratic states, can also have a justice 
promoting effect. Where voters become aware of an environmental issue to the extent that they 
strongly favour timely conclusion of a negotiated agreement, negotiators might be motivated to 
move away from a position strictly in line with economic self-interest and be more likely to 
accept justice principles vis-à-vis other negotiating parties. This is also the case because they 
will be in a better position to justify to their domestic audience concessions made, based on 
moral arguments (justice principles) and in view of the need to conclude an agreement. 
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H4: Where domestic audience interest is high, negotiators will invoke the justice principles 
favoured by their respective domestic audience. Thereby domestic audience interest in timely 
conclusions of the negotiations will increase agreement on justice principles among 
negotiators. 
 
Common crisis experience 
In the environmental issue area, negotiations will often be initiated or spurred on by the parties 
most affected, the so called pollution importers (Sjöstedt 1993: 32), or the parties less capable 
to mitigate or adapt to environmental degradation. Thereby they are often times at least initially 
faced with an opponent that is unwilling to acknowledge the urgency of the matter in cases 
where they are less affected or better able to respond and hence unwilling to endure certain 
short term costs over uncertain long term benefits. In this situation, appeals to justice principles 
are unlikely to promote progress in the negotiation process and may even stall it if parties get 
entrenched on opposing justice positions. When parties undergo a common crisis experience in 
form of an extraordinary event that highlights the negative consequences and related threats of 
environmental degradation to both parties to a considerable extent, this dynamic is expected to 
change. Thereby the experience of negative consequences can take place in form of incurred 
damage or costs to state’s territory or population. While it has been found that the experience 
of a crisis can encourage the initiation of international negotiations (Hampson 1999: 34f.), it is 
argued here that it can also change the dynamics throughout the negotiation process and effect 
justice behaviour by the involved parties. There are at least three different pathways through 
which this change occurs. Firstly, the common experience of a crisis will increase the 
understanding of the environmental degradation as being a threat to all parties and thereby 
balance the power positions of parties involved in the sense that all parties will recognize their 
dependency on the conclusion of a negotiated agreement to address the problem faced. 
Secondly, when parties are able to reframe the issue as “risk of common loss”, they can divert 
from the focus on negotiating costs for mitigation or adaptation and rather focus on developing 
“common aversion strategies” (Suesskind and Ali 2015), thereby increasing the likelihood for 
cooperation. Thirdly, a crisis experience will usually increase the attention of domestic 
audiences to a given issue and strengthen the call for consensual scientific evidence (Haas 1990: 
352f.), thereby strengthening the dynamics as outlined in the two previous sections. 
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In that context, the common experience of an extraordinary environmental crisis underlining 
the harmful consequences of current conduct to all parties, is expected to increase the 
convergence of justice notions in international environmental negotiations. 
H5: The joint experience of an environmental crisis will increase agreement on distributive and 
procedural justice principles invoked. 
 
As particularly the last discussion illustrates, the factors outlined here are interacting and can 
moderate each other’s influence on justice behaviour in international negotiations. For example, 
crisis experience can change the perceived power balance, activate domestic audiences, or 
stimulate increased demand for scientific knowledge. Likewise, the setting in terms of bilateral 
or multilateral level negotiations may have different implication for the role of domestic 
audiences or epistemic communities of scientists and experts. For example, with an increased 
number of states involved, respective domestic audiences opinion will gain in weight, and given 
cross-border coordination, can improve their position of influence vis-à-vis their governments. 
In a similar vein, with a larger number of parties involved, there will presumably be an increased 
number of experts engaged with an issue, enabling collaborative efforts, potentially 
strengthening consensual knowledge positions, and allowing the building of transnational actor 
networks (ref.). More of these types of interlinkages could possibly be found. The important 
conclusion to be drawn is that while in practice, these factors should be understood as integral 
parts of a complex dynamic in international environmental negotiations, for analytical purposes 
it is important to apply a strict methodology and case selection in order to be able to isolate 
individual effects as best as possible. The next session discusses these two aspects for this paper. 
 
Methodology and Case Selection 
This paper aims to identify factors that influence justice behavior in international environmental 
negotiations. Leaning on previous research and findings from related disciplines or fields of 
study, five factors have been identified that are theorized to influence what type of justice 
principle will be invoked or how much congruence there will be among justice principles 
invoked by negotiators. For each factor respectively, a directional statement in form of a 
hypothesis has been formulated. In order to evaluate the truth value of the hypotheses, this paper 
will apply a controlled comparison through the congruence method (George and Bennett 2005: 
181ff.). This approach has been found to be valuable for theories that have been “formulated or 
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postulated by the investigator for the first time” (ibid.: 182), as is the case for the factors 
theorized in this paper. In order to test the hypotheses, the explanatory factors identified have 
to be dichotomized were no natural dichotomy is given (Gerring 2007: 133). The theorized 
factors can then be used to develop expectations or predictions for outcomes of relevant cases. 
If there is congruence between the theoretical prediction and the given outcome of a case, the 
hypothesis can be assumed to depict a causal link. In order to control for the influence of 
alternative variables, the congruence method will be applied across pairs of cases that are being 
selected based on a “most similar” case design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Here, cases 
should ideally be comparable on all factors that were identified to be relevant for the variation 
on the dependent variable except for one, in order to isolate the effect of the explanatory variable 
under investigation. This method of identifying cases that differ only on the factor of interest 
but not on “other possible causal factors” has been found to lend itself to hypothesis-testing 
(Gerring 2007: 131). In order to make an assessment for the range of factors outlined in the 
theory section, a pair of environmental negotiations cases was selected for each factor 
respectively. Thereby, case selection was based on variation in the explanatory variable in 
accordance with the theorized statements developed above, while the dependent variable of 
justice behavior was left to vary (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 149.) As secondary factors, 
variation across the cases on a range of characteristics such as geographical spread, time, and 
environmental issue addressed were also considered. For practical reasons data availability also 
played a role. 
 
A list of potential cases could be as follows : 
Setting: 
- Mediterranean Shores (Fr/Italy + Monacco) vs. Convention For The Protection Of The 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (MedPlan) both 1976 
Power balance: 
- Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal vs. Central American Regional Agreement On The Transboundary 
Movement Of Hazardous Wastes 
Scientific (un)certainty: 
- Acid Rain US-CAN vis á vis Acid Rain EU (+US and CAN) (alternatively, Acid Rain 
Europe within case study) 
Domestic constituency: 




- MARPOL 73 vs MARPOL 78 (pre-/post- 76/77 tanker accidents) 
- Alternatives: Assistance convention negs pre-/post- 1986 Chernobyl; Industrial 
accidents, e.g. Sandoz Germany/Switzerland 
 
Empirical Analysis (1-5) 
The empirical analysis has not yet been concluded. The hypothesis developed in the theory 
section point towards expectations for the controlled comparison and congruence method 
results. Any deviation from the proposed hypotheses will make for an interesting re-evaluation 
of the effect of the hypothesized factor on variation in justice behaviour. 
Discussion 
Next to the findings, this section will discuss limitations of the paper. This includes challenges 
faced with the methodological approach, i.e. that the small number of cases does not allow for 
assessment whether any of the factors identified are necessary conditions (George and Bennett 
2005: 189). Also, even when the “most similar” design is rigorously applied, there remain 
limitations to the comparability of cases that deal with social phenomena. Thus, in further 
research any factors that have been identified to play a role in influencing justice behaviour 
could be further tested through process tracing in order to validate the findings, investigate 
causal pathways, and so forth. Additionally, the findings could be tested on a larger set of cases 
in form of a quantitative study, possibly also transporting them to other issuer areas in order to 









Albin, Cecilia (2015). The Many Faces of Justice in International Negotiations. International 
Negotiation 20: 41–58. 
Albin, Cecilia and Druckman, Daniel (2014a). Bargaining over Weapons: Justice and 
Effectiveness in Arms Control Negotiations. International Negotiation 19: 426–458. 
Albin, Cecilia and Druckman, Daniel (2014b). Procedures matter: Justice and effectiveness in 
international trade negotiations. European Journal of International Relations 20: 1014–
1042. 
Albin, Cecilia and Druckman, Daniel (forthcoming). Justice and effectiveness in international 
environmental negotiations. Article, under review. 
Albin, Cecilia and Young, Ariel (2012). Setting the Table for Success – or Failure? Agenda 
Management in the WTO. International Negotiation 17/1: 37-64. 
Barry, Brian (1989). Democracy, Power, and Justice. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Barry, Brian (1995). Justice as Impartiality. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Benedick, Richard Elliot (1993). Perspectives of a Negotiation Practitioner. In: Sjöstedt, 
Gunnar (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations. Newbury Park, Sage 
Publications, 219-243. 
Chasek, P. (1997). A Comparative Analysis of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations. Group 
Decision and Negotiation 6: 437–461. 
Chasek, P. (2001). Earth Negotiations – Analyzing Thirty Tears if Environmental Diplomacy. 
New York, Uniten Nations University Press. 
Cook, Karen S., and Hegtvedt, Karen A. (1983). Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality. 
Annual Review of Sociology 9: 217–241. 
Deutsch, Morton (1975). Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be 
Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice? Journal of Social Issues 31: 137–149. 
Druckman, Daniel and Albin, Cecilia (2011). Distributive Justice and the Durability of Peace 
Agreements. Review of International Studies 37: 1137-1168. 
Druckman, Daniel and Wagner, Lynn (2016). Justice and Negotiation. Annual Review of 
Psychology 67: 387–413. 
Eckhoff, Torstein (1974). Justice Its Determinants in Social Interaction. Rotterdam, Rotterdam 
Press. 
Faure, Guy-Olivier and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1993). Organizing Concepts and Questions. In: 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (ed.), International Environmental Negotiations. Newbury Park, Sage 
Publications, 17-26. 
Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868. 
Gauthier, David (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Gerring, John (2007). Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Grasso, M. (2010). The role of justice in the North–South conflict in climate change: the case 
of negotiations on the Adaptation Fund. Int Environ Agreements 11: 361–377. 
Haas, Peter M. (1989). Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control. International Organization 43: 377–403. 
Haas, P.M. (1990). Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic 
Consensus. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 19: 347–363. 
Hampson, Fen Olser (1999). Multilateral negotiations: lessons from arms control, trade, and 
the environment. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
17 
 
Kapstein, Ethan (2008). Fairness Considerations in World Politics: Lessons from International 
Trade Negotiations. Political Science Quarterly 123: 229–245. 
Kaul, Inge and Ronald U. Mendoza (2003). Advancing the Concept of Public Goods. In: Kaul, 
Inge, Pedro Conceicao, and Katell Le Goulven (eds.), Providing Global Public Goods: 
Managing Globalization. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 78-111. 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba Sidney (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, Princeton University Press.  
Kjellén, Bo (2008). A New Diploüacy for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Global 
Change. London: Taylor & Francis. 
Lange, Andreas, Andreas Löschel, Carsten Vogt, and Andreas Ziegler (2010). On the Self-
Interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations. European Economic 
Review 54 (3): 359–75. 
Lind, E. Allan and P. Christopher Earley (1992), “Procedural Justice and Culture” International 
Journal of Psychology 27 (2): 227. 
Müller, Harald (2010). Between Power and Justice: Current Problems and Perspectives of the 
NPT Regime. Strategic Analysis 34: 189–201. 
Müller, Harald (2013). Agency is Central. In: Müller, Harald and Wunderlich, Carmen (eds.): 
Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control. Interests, Conflict, and Justice. Athens, 
Georgia: University of Geoprgia Press, 337-365. 
Page, Edward (2012). The hidden costs of carbon commodification: emissions trading, political 
legitimacy and procedural justice. Democratization 19: 932–950. 
Przeworski, Adam and Teune, Henry (1970). The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New 
York, Wiley. 
Putnam, Robert (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. 
International Organization, 41(3): 427–460. 
Rao, Narasimha (2013). International and intranational equity in sharing climate change 
mitigation burdens. International Environmental Agreements 14: 129–146. 
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Ringius, Lasse, Torvanger, Asbjorn, and Underdal, Arild (2002). Burden Sharing and Fairness 
Principles in International Climate Policy. International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 2: 1–22. 
Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (2002). The Actors in Negotiation. In: Kremenyuk, Victoa A. (ed): 
International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues. New York: Jossey-Bass, 97-109. 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (1993). Special and Typical Attributes of International Environmental 
Negotiations. In: Sjöstedt, GUnnare, Svedin, Udo and Hägerhäll Aniansson, Britt (eds.). 
International Environmental Negotiations: Process, Issues and Contexts. Stockholm, 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 22-39. 
Sjöstedt, Gunnar (2009). Negotiating Climate Change. In:Avenhaus, Rudolf and Sjöstedt, 
Gunnar (eds.). Negotiated Risk: International Talks on Hazardous Issues. Springer, Berlin 
and Heidelberg, 229-257. 
Skodvin, Tora and Underdal, Arild (2000). Exploring the Dynamics of the Science-Politics 
Interaction. In: Andresen, Steinar, Skodvin Tora, Underdal Arild and Wettestad Jørgen 
(2000). Science and politics in international environmental regimes: between integrity and 
involvement. Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press): 22-34. 
Spector, Bertram I. (1992). International Environmnetal Ngotiations: Insights for Practice. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Executive Report 21. 
Susskind Lawrence E. and Ali, Saleem (2015). Environmental Diplomacy Negotiating More 
Effective Global Agreements. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
18 
 
Tannenwald, Nina (2013). Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. Ethics 
& International Affairs 27: 299–317. 
Thibaut John and Walker Laurens (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Tritschoks, Annkatrin (2016). Rethinking Justice in International Environmental Negotiations: 
Toward a More Comprehensive Approach. Manuscript in preparation. 
Underdal, Arild (2000). Comparative Conclusions. In: Andresen, Steinar, Skodvin Tora, 
Underdal Arild and Wettestad Jørgen (2000). Science and politics in international 
environmental regimes: between integrity and involvement. Manchester and New York, 
Manchester University Press): 181-201. 
Weiss, Edith (1993). International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the 
Emergence of a New World Order. Georgetown Law Journal 81: 675-710. 
Weiss, Edith (2008). Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and International Law. 
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 9: 615-628. 
Welch, David (1993). Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Welch, David (2014). The Justice Motive in International Relations: Past, Present, and Future. 
International Negotiation 19: 410–425. 
Young, Peyton, and Wolf, Amanda (1992). Global Warming Negotiations: Does Fairness 
Matter? The Brookings Review 10: 46–51. 
Zartman, William (1992). International environmental negotiation: Challenges for analysis and 
practice. Negotiation Journal 8: 113–123. 
Zartman, William (1995). The Role of Justice in Global Security Negotiations. American 
Behavioral Scientist 38: 889–903. 
Zartman, William (2005). Looking Forward and Looking Backward on Negotiation Theory. In: 
Zartman, William and Kremenyuk, Victor (eds.): Peace versus Justice, Negotiating 
Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes. New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
289-301. 
Zeitoun, Mark (2013). Global environmental justice and international transboundary waters: an 
initial exploration. Geographical Journal 179: 141–149. 
